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ABSTRACT
The large number of asylum seekers dying off the coast of Libya has
turned the Southern Mediterranean Sea into a new humanitarian
space, prompting 11 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
launch maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) operations between 2014
and 2017. These NGOs engaged in a complex web of interactions,
ranging from rare instances of hostility, competition and mistrust to
coordination, cooperation and integration. Drawing on role theory, I
argue that organisational role conceptions are key to shaping NGO–
NGO interactions. The humanitarian principles of neutrality,
impartiality and independence serve as action scripts that inform
NGOs’ role in the humanitarian space. Sea rescue NGOs have
upheld different interpretations of humanitarian principles,
developing supportive, neutral, or confrontational approaches vis-à-
vis European governments’ border control policies. By leveraging
content analysis and semi-structured interviews, I show that
organisations with matching role conceptions have engaged in
tighter forms of cooperation; charities with divergent role
conceptions, by contrast, have shown a tendency to develop
mistrust and engage in more competitive interactions. These
frictions inhibited NGOs from forming a united front vis-à-vis policy
restrictions and criminalisation, hindering the legitimacy and
viability of non-governmental sea rescue.
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Between 2014 and 2018, 11 NGOs conducted maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) missions
off the coast of Libya, assisting almost 120,000 people in distress. While key to enhancing
human security at Europe’s southern maritime borders, non-governmental SAR entails
severe operational, legal and ethical dilemmas. Since 2017, the Italian government has
imposed restrictions on NGOs’ activities, seeking to co-opt humanitarians in the fight
against human smuggling. Initially praised as “angels” and “heroes”, sea rescue NGOs
have been increasingly criticised as a “pull factor” of irregular migration, facing a crimina-
lisation process that culminated into the confiscation of several ships (Allsopp et al. 2020,
Cusumano and Villa 2020). Consequently, the Mediterranean Sea has not only become a
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new humanitarian space, but also a discursive battlefield over the meaning of humanitar-
ianism and the appropriateness of assisting irregular migrants at state borders.
Despite its relevance, non-governmental sea rescue has not yet obtained the systematic
scholarly attention dedicated to humanitarian action on land. To be sure, some studies have
examined the discursive frames of “border humanitarians” (Stierl 2018), their role in “repo-
liticising” migration governance (Cuttitta 2018, pp. 650–51), and the normative dilemmas
attached to non-governmental sea rescue (Cusumano and Pattison 2018, McDowell
2020). Recent research has also critically examined the criminalisation of maritime humani-
tarian workers and its implications (Fekete 2018, Tazzioli 2018, Cusumano and Villa 2020,
Gordon and Larsen 2020). All scholarship to date, however, has mainly focused on sea
rescue NGOs’ relationship with state actors. Studies dedicated to mapping and explaining
the interactions between these NGOs, by contrast, remain missing.
The literature on humanitarianism at large has also dedicated sparse attention to
cooperation and competition between NGOs. Existing scholarship has thoroughly exam-
ined the relationship between NGOs and state authorities (Krause 2014, Brass 2016) and
the interactions between humanitarians and military personnel (Ruffa and Vennesson
2014). Recent studies have zoomed into the web of relationships taking place within
the humanitarian sector, studying issues like the formation of non-profit clubs (Deloffre
2016), NGOs’ relationship with their donors (Egger 2017), and organisations’ varying pro-
pensity to share information on sensitive issues like their security policies (Schneiker
2020). However, no studies to date have sought to systematically explain humanitarian
organisations’ tendency to develop cooperative or competitive relationships.
Why do NGOs cooperate with some of their counterparts in the humanitarian field and
keep some others at arm’s length? By explaining the interactions between all the NGOs
providing SAR off the coast of Libya between 2014 and 2018, this paper seeks to
address this gap. I argue that organisational role conceptions are crucial in shaping the
nature and intensity of NGO–NGO interactions, which can be operationalised along a
spectrum ranging from outright hostility, competition and mistrust to coexistence,
coordination, cooperation, and full integration. Specifically, organisations with matching
role conceptions are likely to develop tighter, cooperative interactions; conversely, organ-
isations with diverging role conceptions tend to engage in competitive relations ranging
from hostility to mistrust. Role conceptions provide a more accurate explanation of NGO–
NGO interactions at sea than competing explanations based on the political economy of
the humanitarian sector, sociological institutionalism and organisations’ nationality.
These findings not onlyprovide a theoretical contribution to the studyofhumanitarianism
andglobalgovernance,butalsohave timelypolicy implications.Coordinationbetweenhuma-
nitarian actors is key to effectively deliver humanitarian relief and especially crucial to conduct
SAR in theMediterranean.Hence, understanding the factorsunderlyingNGOs’cooperation (or
lack thereof) is key to enhancing human security at sea. Moreover, NGOs’ inability to form a
unified front against policy restrictions anddelegitimisation attemptsweakened the cohesion
of the humanitarian front, facilitating the criminalisation of non-governmental sea rescue.
Multiple sources and methods are used. I investigate the interactions developed by
each NGO with its counterparts through a structured, focused comparison (George and
Bennett 2005, pp. 67–73) of all the organisations operating off the coast of Libya
between 2014 and 2017, when maritime rescue NGOs peaked. Evidence consists of a
content analysis of all NGOs’ websites, mission statements and press releases, media
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articles as well as personal conversations and semi-structured anonymised interviews
held in Rome, Malta and during a rescue mission off the coast of Libya in which I partici-
pated in August 2016. Interviewees include spokespersons from each NGOs as well as
Italian Navy and Coast Guard officers.
The article is divided as follows. The second and third section identify some competing
explanations for NGO–NGO interactions, arguing that a constructivist approach based on
role theory offers the most fine-grained explanation of competition and cooperation
between humanitarian charities. The fourth section operationalises NGO–NGO inter-
actions through an original typology comprising of several directly observable indicators.
The fifth section presents all the non-governmental organisations operating off the Libyan
coasts between 2014 and the end of 2017. The sixth and seventh sections assess the
theoretical framework against the evidence provided by maritime rescue NGOs,
showing that (in)compatible role conceptions explain NGO–NGO interactions much
better than competing explanations. The conclusions summarise the findings of the
article and flesh out their theoretical and policy implications.
2. Explaining NGO–NGO interactions
The complex web of interactions between relief NGOs has remained largely under-theo-
rized. However, an examination of extant scholarship allows for identifying three influen-
tial approaches to the study of humanitarian action at large that are applicable to
explaining relations between NGOs: the political economy of the humanitarian sector,
sociological institutionalism, and the notion of NGOs’ national identities. This section
will present these approaches, turning each of them into a source of empirically observa-
ble expectations on NGO–NGO relations.
Political economy approaches to non-profit organisations mainly explain the behav-
iour of NGOs and their sometimes dysfunctional record on the grounds of humanitarian
charities’ material interests. Like firms in a market, humanitarian NGOs struggling to
secure limited funding and public attention should inevitably develop competitive
relations (Cooley and Ron 2002). Motivated primarily by organisational survival and
autonomy preservation, NGOs providing the same type of services and drawing on the
same pool of resources should be inevitably set to compete, especially in contexts of
growing organisational density (Mitchell 2014, Bush and Hadden 2019). To reduce com-
petition, NGOs should discourage newcomers from entering their turf, creating entry bar-
riers into the humanitarian space. Cooperation may only exist between organisations
operating in different areas, providing complementary rather than identical activities
and relying on different donors to fund their work (Mitchell 2014, Bush and Hadden
2019). Accordingly, we should expect the maritime humanitarian sector – populated by
several small organisations conducting the same tasks in the same area – to engage in
largely competitive relations. A modicum of cooperation should only occur between
NGOs providing different types of rescue services and relying on different pools of donors.
Sociological institutionalism, by contrast, suggests that competition between NGOs
should be mitigated by the existence of a tight set of rules and norms. International
and domestic legal codes, combined with the coordinating role played by state auth-
orities and international organisations, create formal institutional regimes that reduce
uncertainty, encourage trust, and enable or even mandate cooperation. Moreover, the
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frequent exchange of information and personnel and the increasing professionalisation
and bureaucratisation of the sector enables humanitarians’ socialisation to the same
logics of appropriateness, fostering normative isomorphism and mutual solidarity
within the humanitarian community (Barnett and Weiss 2008, Barnett 2009). Hence, insti-
tutionalism suggest that sea rescue NGOs engage in broadly cooperative relations due to
the coordinating role of the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) and the
compliance pull of the maritime rescue norm (Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014,
Mann 2016, Cusumano and Pattison 2018).
Recent scholarship has forcefully argued that understanding the behaviour of NGOs
requires looking into organisational identity and culture. Far from sharing a single
mindset, humanitarians constantly “debate about who they are and what practices are
reflective of their identity” and, conversely, “who they believe they are not and the prac-
tices they deem illegitimate” (Barnett and Weiss 2008, p. 5). Scholars have increasingly
examined how these different mindsets affect advocacy and humanitarian relief oper-
ations. Most notably, Stroup (2012) argues that NGOs’ behaviour is mainly informed by
national traditions. Drawing on this approach, we should therefore expect sea rescue
NGOs to build tighter relationships when headquartered in or comprising of personnel
from the same nationality.
3. Humanitarian role conceptions
Although they provide valuable insights, these three approaches do not suffice in explain-
ing NGO–NGO interactions at sea. The explanation based on humanitarian role con-
ceptions I develop in this section, by contrast, better accounts for interaction between
sea rescue charities. The extent to which NGOs cooperate depends not only on material
interests, norms, and nationality, but mainly derives from how each organisation under-
stands its role, which in turn is primarily informed by their interpretation of humanitarian
principles. Like the scripts of actors on a stage, humanitarian principles guide NGOs’
behaviour in the humanitarian space, shaping the nature and intensity of their inter-
actions. As explained below, however, NGOs have developed increasingly different
interpretations of humanitarian principles. I therefore argue that likeminded organis-
ations sharing a similar interpretation of humanitarian principles tend to develop more
cooperative relations even when they conduct identical activities and rely on the same
pool of donors. By contrast, organisations with very different role conceptions are likely
to engage in antagonistic relationships characterised by hostility, competition or mistrust
despite the absence of such material pressures and the existence of binding rules and
coordination mechanisms. Matching or dissonant role conceptions serve as the most
accurate explanation for competition and cooperation between maritime humanitarian
NGOs.
Most scholarship to date has referred to NGOs’ different mindset as organisational cul-
tures (Stroup 2012, Krause 2014) or identities (Barnett and Weiss 2008, Schneiker 2020). In
this article, I opt for the narrower notion of role conception, defined as the shared beliefs
in the proper purpose of specific collective actors. By departing from role theory’s
assumption that actors’ behaviour is informed by specific scripts, role conceptions are
useful heuristic tools to make sense of regular, dyadic interactions between individuals
and collective actors (Walker 2017). While constructivist international relations scholars
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have mainly applied role conceptions to state foreign policy (Harnisch et al. 2011,
Brummer and Thies 2012), this notion is especially applicable to smaller collective entities
like NGOs.
Humanitarianism is a contested term that is notoriously difficult to define. Although
sometimes used broadly to label all philanthropic initiatives stemming from a concern
for distant others, humanitarianism is more frequently identified with the ideological
movement leading to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), still referred to by the International Court of Justice as the repository of humani-
tarianism and its key principles (Barnett 2009, Gordon and Donini 2016, p. 79, Sezgin
and Dijkzeul 2016). The focus of humanitarian action has increasingly broadened from
conflict to epidemic outbreaks, famines, and natural disasters. Maritime rescue started
to be seen as a form of humanitarian action since the late 1970s Vietnamese boat
people crisis, when NGOs like Cap Anamur first deployed a boat at sea to assist refugees
in distress. Although Cap Anamur conducted a sea rescue operation in the Mediterranean
in 2005, indictment by an Italian court caused the organisation to close its doors (Cuttitta
2018, p. 638). Initially welcomed by Italian authorities, the sea rescue NGOs operating in
the Mediterranean since 2014 have also suffered growing criminalisation (Allsopp et al.
2020, Cusumano and Villa 2020, Tazzioli 2018). The criminalisation of solidarity at sea
has exacerbated the dilemmas attached to non-governmental maritime rescue, widening
NGOs’ disagreement on the extent to which SAR can and should be conducted in accord-
ance with humanitarian principles.
Seen as the guiding compass in relief operations, the humanitarian principles of neu-
trality, impartiality, and independence can be conceptualised as the action scripts shaping
the role that NGOs play. Since the founding of the ICRC, neutrality from interstate contro-
versies has been seen as the best way to isolate humanitarians from politics, obtain access
to people in need, and ensure the safety of aid workers in the field. Since the end of the
Cold War, however, this traditional form of humanitarianism has been increasingly chal-
lenged by “new” humanitarian actors. New humanitarians have embraced a broader
agenda seeking to frame the recipients of aid as entitled to a wider array of human
rights rather than passive targets of Western saviours’ benevolence (Slim 2015, Sezgin
and Dijkzeul 2016, Adami 2019). Moreover, new humanitarians’ commitment to address
the root causes of humanitarian crises rather than merely alleviating suffering has
prompted new humanitarians to pursue a more confrontational approach towards state
actors. Ultimately, new humanitarians have prioritised human rights advocacy and solidarity
with the victims over the allegedly dogmatic understanding of neutrality underlying tra-
ditional humanitarianism, criticised as “moral apathy” (Slim 2015, Gordon and Donini
2016, p. 91). The divide between traditional and new humanitarian role conceptions is
acknowledged by several scholars, who have sometimes used alternative dichotomies
like those between “alchemical” and “emergency humanitarianism” Barnett (2009, p. 39),
“Dunantist” and “Wilsonian” organisations (Stoddard 2003, pp. 1–2), or “Dunantist” and
“rights-based” NGOs (Adami 2019). As a novel form of humanitarian action that focuses
on a heavily politicised issue like irregular migration, sea rescue in the Mediterranean has
attracted several new humanitarian organisations combining relief with a commitment
to address the root causes of migrant deaths at sea, identified in European countries’ restric-
tive border and asylum policies. These NGOs have therefore combined SAR and open
border activism (Cuttitta 2018, Mainwaring and De Bono 2020, Squire 2020).
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According to critics, the development of a new humanitarian role conception has
made relief increasingly vulnerable to politicisation and instrumentalisation, paving
the way for the involvement of new actors in the humanitarian arena (Gordon and
Donini 2016). Most notably, various far-right groups have created not-for-profit organ-
isations and actively portrayed themselves as humanitarians (Bob 2012, Schneiker 2018).
One of these groups, the far-right youth organisation Defend Europe, deployed a ship in
the Mediterranean to simultaneously rescue migrants and curb irregular migration.
Organisations like Defend Europe uphold a different, identitarian role conception that
drastically departs from the principle of impartiality in the provision of relief, setting
them apart from both traditional and new humanitarians. Although their presence at
sea was limited and their humanitarian credentials questionable at best, an extreme,
outlier case like Defend Europe provides additional insights into how diverging role
conceptions inhibit cooperation between not-for-profit organisations. The simultaneous
presence of actors upholding traditional humanitarian, new humanitarian, and identitar-
ian roles played a key role in shaping NGO–NGO interactions at sea. To assess this argu-
ment, the next section will operationalise their interactions through an original
typology.
4. NGO–NGO relations: a typology
Mapping interactions across NGOs is a complex task belying simplistic dichotomies
between amity and enmity. Rather than dichotomously, the relationship between
different actors could be fruitfully conceptualised on a spectrum ranging from full inte-
gration to outright hostility. Hostility reflects an unwillingness to share the humanitarian
space with rival organisations and it is therefore characterised by open attempts to
disrupt counterparts’work. Competition captures the struggle over material but also sym-
bolic resources and the ensuing discursive struggle over who is the “real” humanitarian,
while mistrust refers to a less pronounced wariness of counterparts’ motives or profes-
sionalism. Coexistence identifies a neutral stance, describing situations when NGOs
acknowledge each other’s positive role in the humanitarian space and ensure a
modicum of mutual information sharing and deconfliction on the field. Coordination,
cooperation and integration require the existence of common goals and a willingness
to work together, which may remain limited to information sharing, entail a transfer of
equipment, expertise, and personnel, or escalate into a full integration of advocacy, oper-
ational planning and relief missions. Each of these types of interactions can be operatio-
nalised through specific, observable indicators, based on organisations’ behaviour at the
headquarters and field level as well as organisations’ public and off-the-record discourse
(Table 1).
As the remainder of the article will show, role conceptions provide important insights
into the tightness of NGO–NGO interactions at sea. Organisations playing similar roles
are more inclined to coordinate, cooperate, or join forces. By contrast, NGOs with some-
what dissonant role conceptions should develop mutual mistrust and limit their inter-
actions to peaceful coexistence or the modicum of coordination required by
operational contingencies and legal obligations. Last, organisations playing incompati-
ble roles will not simply mistrust each other, but also engage in competitive or openly
hostile forms of interaction.
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5. The sea as humanitarian space: maritime rescue NGOs
The large increase in casualties occurred in the Central Mediterranean corridor connecting
Libya to Italy has turned Europe’s southern maritime borders into a novel humanitarian
space. Systematic non-governmental rescue missions started in September 2014 with
the creation of the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS). In less than two years, nine
other NGOs followed (Cuttitta 2018, Stierl 2018, Cusumano 2019). Since mid-2017,
Italian authorities have sought to increasingly restrain NGOs’ activities, asking all NGOs
to sign a code of conduct whose provisions included the dispatch of Italian police
officers aboard their ships. One of the non-signatory NGOs – the German youth organis-
ation Jugend Rettet – had its boat impounded for allegedly abetting illegal immigration
soon thereafter (Cusumano and Villa 2020). The criminalisation of SAR NGOs culminated
in the summer of 2018, when Italy declared its ports closed to all foreign-flagged vessels
(Berti 2020, McDowell 2020). Between 2014 and early 2017, however, NGOs could rely on a
more permissive legal and political environment to conduct SAR, which offered compara-
tively fewer logistical and security challenges than most crisis scenarios on land. Thanks to
its feasibility and limited costs, maritime SAR proved financially viable even for small,
newly established charities (Cusumano 2019). This section briefly examines the NGOs pro-
viding SAR between 2014 and 2017.
5.1. The Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS)
The Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) was created in 2014 by the owners of a business
intelligence firm, who bought and reconverted a fishing vessel. By relying on maritime
security professionals including retired Maltese Navy officers and unmanned
Table 1. NGO–NGOs interactions.
Type of relationship Indicators
Hostility . Attempts to disrupt each other’s work
. Attempts to sabotage each other’s fundraising
. Attempts to denounce each other to public authorities
Competition . Attempt to present oneself as more effective or legitimate than counterparts
. Mutual criticism expressed in public
Mistrust . Mutual criticism expressed in private and/or off the record
. Unwillingness to share information
Coexistence . Exchange of basic information in the field
. Public acknowledgment of counterparts’ positive role
Coordination . Regular exchange of information in the field
. Exchange of information at the directive level
Cooperation . Regular exchange of information at field and directive levels
. Exchange of personnel
. Exchange of equipment
. Mutual solidarity against criminalisation




reconnaissance drones, MOAS was the first NGO that detected and rescued migrants off
the coast of Libya, disembarking them in the port indicated by Italian authorities.
Since its outset, MOAS developed a traditional humanitarian role, grounded on a strict
interpretation of the principle of neutrality and a “prudent, non-confrontational attitude”
towards European governments (Cuttitta 2018, p. 640). This mindset is clearly illustrated
by slogans like “Save lives first. Sort out the politics later” and the organisation’s mission
statement, stressing that “MOAS is not a political action group […]. All MOAS does is help
rescue humans who would otherwise drown” (MOAS 2016). Accordingly, MOAS devel-
oped a rescue model that maximed both their operational effectiveness and Italian auth-
orities’ support. By employing experienced security personnel like the former commander
of the Armed Forces of Malta, MOAS effectively presented itself as a reliable counterpart
to the Italian Coast Guard, complementing rather than overriding European maritime
border control missions like Frontex operation Triton and the EU Common Security and
Defence Policy mission EUNAVFOR Med Sophia (Riddervold 2018). To safeguard a good
working relationship with Italian authorities, MOAS carefully complied with MRCC instruc-
tions, shared information and video footage with the Italian police, and was the first sig-
natory of the 2017 code of conduct (Cusumano 2019).
MOAS’ neutral stance did not only facilitate its relationship with Italian authorities, but
also inevitably shaped its interactions with other NGOs. Initially, the Maltese charity briefly
relied on the financial and operational support of the Amsterdam branch of MSF, which
dispatched medical personnel onboard. This cooperation, however, was discontinued
after a few months due to “diverging views” between the two organisations.1 After
MSF’s withdrawal, MOAS developed a partnership with the Italian Red Cross, which
stepped in as their new provider of onboard medical support throughout 2016 and 2017.
5.2. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)
While MOAS is a small NGO established with the sole purpose of conducting SAR, MSF is
an established international medical organisation a yearly budget of over a billion euros.
Differences between the two NGOs are not limited to material capabilities. Since the Cold
War, MSF has been a prominent voice within the new humanitarian camp, MSF’s commit-
ment to advocacy and addressing the root causes of suffering is apparent in the organ-
isation’s slogan of “Soigner et témoigner”, or “heal and witness”. The same approach is
reflected in the organisation’s decision to conduct SAR in the Mediterranean, seen not
only as an opportunity to provide relief, but also as a platform for promoting a “radical
re-think of migration policy based on the establishment of a legal and safe passage to
Europe” (Cuttitta 2018, p. 644, Pallister-Wilkins 2018, Stierl 2018).
Three different European branches of MSF became involved in sea rescue. MSF Amster-
dam opted for addressing their lack of seafaring skills by partnering with other organis-
ations. After suspending their initial collaboration with MOAS, MSF Amsterdam started
a partnership with SOS-Méditerranée. The Brussels and Barcelona branches, on the
other hand, developed autonomous SAR capabilities by buying an old ship and chartering
a newer vessel, used to rescue migrants and transfer them into the port designated by
Italian authorities.
Although they developed independent missions, each of these MSF branches shared a
common role conception that urged them to stay aloof from European authorities, whose
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restrictive migration policies they held responsible for deaths at sea. MSF did not only
relinquish accepting European states’ funding for migration-related projects, but also
refused handing over information to Frontex and the Italian police. Accordingly, its
crews refrained from producing video footage that could be used as court evidence
against suspect human smugglers, a behaviour they considered incompatible with the
humanitarian principle of independence (Cuttitta 2018). Moreover, MSF declined
signing the 2017 code of conduct, flagging the boarding of police officers on their
vessels as an unacceptable violation of the principle of independence and the prohibition
to carry arms in any MSF mission worldwide (Cusumano and Villa 2020). As the next sec-
tions show, MSF developed an especially close relationship with the other NGOs that
shared their disapproval of European migration policies.
5.3. Sea-Watch
Unlike both MOAS and MSF, Sea-Watch initially stopped short of developing fully fledged
SAR missions, limiting its operations to providing life vests, water and urgent medical
support until the arrival of a bigger ship (Cusumano 2019, p. 247; Cuttitta 2018,
pp. 642–643). This approach was dictated by both limited rescue capabilities, which
initially consisted of a handful of volunteers aboard an old fishing trawler, and their dis-
tinctively new humanitarian role conception. Founded by activists with a background in
the German left and conservation NGOs such as Greenpeace, Sea-Watch developed a
more confrontational attitude vis-à-vis state authorities and a strong commitment to
advocacy and whistleblowing. By simultaneously acting as a watchdog and rescuing
migrants without disembarking them to a place of safety, Sea-Watch deliberately
sought to both save lives and compel European governments to act (Squire 2020, Cuttitta
2018, Stierl 2018).
Effective fundraising eventually allowed Sea-Watch to purchase two larger boats and
launch an aerial reconnaissance mission. Their approach to maritime rescue, however,
remained based on a combination of humanitarianism and citizen activism grounded
on the “politics of witnessing” (Squire 2020, p. 134). As Sea-Watch endeavoured to
allow European citizens to directly witness the suffering caused by the EU’s restrictive
border policies, crews continued to be comprised mainly of volunteers. Alongside
rescue operations at sea, Sea-Watch organised events among German citizenry. In
October 2015, for instance, a dinghy retrieved in the Mediterranean was placed on the
Spree River and German MPs from the nearby Bundestag were asked to board to
better understand migrants’ plight. Such interventions epitomise the inextricable link
between political activism and humanitarian action underlying Sea-Watch’s role con-
ception (Squire 2020, Stierl 2018).
Besides directly providing SAR, Sea-Watch endeavoured to serve as a model for like-
minded organisations, providing advice and operational support for other small NGOs
like Jugend Rettet, Lifeboat and Mission Lifeline (Cusumano 2019).
5.4. Sea-Eye, Jugend Rettet, Lifeboat and Mission Lifeline
Sea-Watch’s model was followed by other small German charities, namely Jugend Rettet,
Lifeboat, and Mission Lifeline. Jugend Rettet – a young adults Berlin-based organisation
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which started operations in July 2016 – also combined humanitarianism and political acti-
vism, upholding a confrontational approach to European authorities and a more radical,
openly political position grounded on the request for a “safe passage” to Europe. Like Sea-
Watch, which advised their first operations, Jugend Rettet missions were run primarily by
volunteers and funded through small individual donations (Cusumano 2019). Soon after
refusing to sign the code of conduct, Jugend Rettet had to stop its activities once an
Italian court charged one of its crews with abetting illegal immigration and confiscated
its ship. The investigation is still ongoing at the time of writing (Cusumano and Villa 2020).
The Lifeboat project is another German NGO that started operations in 2016. Like
Jugend Rettet, the Lifeboat project relied on several personnel previously volunteering
for Sea-Watch, capitalising on their experience to rapidly start their rescuing operations.
In protest against the tightening grip against non-governmental rescuers epitomised by
the Code of Conduct and facing budgetary problems, the German charity suspended its
activities in August 2017.
Mission Lifeline was the last German charity to start SAR operations in the Central Med-
iterranean. They began operating in the summer of 2017 aboard a ship handed over to
them by Sea-Watch. Like Sea-Watch and Jugend Rettet, Mission Lifeline drew primarily
from activists with a left-wing political background. Its operations, however, were rela-
tively short-lived. In the summer of 2018, after a long standoff between Italy and Malta,
Valletta eventually authorised the Lifeline to disembark a group of migrants in its port.
Upon entering Malta, the Lifeline was impounded, and its shipmaster prosecuted for abet-
ting illegal immigration.
These NGOs all drew inspiration from the Sea-Watch model and embraced new huma-
nitarian roles. The very structure of these organisations – which have relied on volunteers
and activists rather than professional aid workers – explicitly challenges the separation
between neutral humanitarianism and political advocacy that underlies traditional
humanitarianism.
5.5. Sea-Eye and Proactiva Open Arms
Sea-Eye started operations in May 2016 from a reconverted fishing boat named after the
organisation, complemented in late 2017 by a second small vessel. Like Sea-Watch, Sea-
Eye decided to run mission consisting in spotting and assisting boats in distress until the
arrival of a larger boat. While the operational model and even the name of Sea-Eye mirror
Sea-Watch’s, Sea-Eye tapped into the funding base and organisational resources of
German Protestant churches rather than left-wing social movements. Consequently, it dis-
played a more nuanced approach anchored on the principle of neutrality a greater pro-
pensity to accept Italian authorities’ request, epitomised by Sea-Eye’s signature of the
2017 code of conduct.
Proactiva Open Arms was established as the not-for-profit branch of Proactiva, a firm
from Barcelona providing lifeguard services on Spanish coasts. Initially operating in the
Aegean, Open Arms relocated to the Central Mediterranean in June 2016. Due to the
small size of its first vessel, the Spanish charity initially refrained from shuttling migrants
to Italian ports, limiting its activities to assisting those in danger of drowning. As the chari-
table spin-off of a maritime safety firm, Open Arms developed a traditional humanitarian
role and a narrow, pragmatic approach to sea rescue that shares some similarities with
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MOAS’. As stated by an interviewee, “we come from a lifeguard business, we are life-
guards. We save lives, we don’t do politics”.2 Accordingly, Open Arms was the third organ-
isation that signed the code of conduct, seen as crucial to preserve a smooth collaboration
with Italian authorities. Only in 2018, after their ship was impounded, did Open Arms
develop a more critical stance. Consistent with a traditional humanitarian role conception,
however, Open Arms maintained a collaborative approach towards Italian authorities
until criminalisation attempts undermined any possibility for dialogue.
5.6. SOS-Méditerranée and Save the Children
A joint initiative of a French humanitarian previously working for Medecins du Monde and
a German shipmaster, SOS-Méditerranée started operating in February 2016 after charter-
ing the largest ship in the humanitarian fleet, capable of operating in all weather con-
ditions and carrying up to 800 people. The crew consisted of a rescue team composed
of SOS-Méditerranée’s own personnel and a medical unit provided by MSF Amsterdam.
Together, the two organisations decided to refrain from accepting EU governments’
donations, seen as incompatible with their mutual willingness to distance themselves
fromEuropean authorities. After initiallyflagging the 2017 codeof conduct as incompatible
with humanitarian principles, SOS-Méditerranée eventually accepted to sign the document.
They did so, however, only after Italian authorities toneddown several of the code’s original
provision, including the caveat that police officer would not be allowed aboard without a
warrant. Although it begrudgingly signed the code, SOS-Méditerranée displays many fea-
tures of new humanitarian organisations and shared the same confrontational mindset
of MSF, illustrated by their frequent criticism of European migration governance.
In September 2016, the large number of minors crossing the Mediterranean also urged
Save the Children (Save) to join SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean, charting a
large ship to rescue asylum seekers and disembark them in the ports indicated by the
Italian MRCC. Unlike all other sea rescue charities but MSF, Save is a large INGO with an
annual budget of over 2 billion US dollars. As already noted by previous scholarship,
Save upholds a traditional humanitarian role conception (Stroup 2012). This finding is
confirmed by the main features of their maritime rescue operations. First, Save proactively
looked for government donations, including the UK Department for International Devel-
opment. Second, Save closely cooperated with Italian authorities, complying with their
request to hand over evidence to Italian courts. Accordingly, Save immediately signed
the code of conduct. This pragmatic stance is further illustrated by Save’s reliance on
private security contractors from the Italian firm IMI Security Services, which provided
both unarmed guards to ensure order aboard their ship and professional rescuers. Infor-
mation provided by IMI contractors was used by Italian authorities to indict Jugend Rettet
for abetting illegal immigration (Cusumano and Villa 2020).
5.7. Defend Europe
Defend Europe is a not-for-profit organisation created by the French, German, Austrian
and Italian sections of Generation Identity, a far-right youth movement committed to pro-
tecting European identity from unregulated migration and Islamification (Schneiker
2018). Defend Europe’s maritime operations started in May 2017, when some activists
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sought to block an NGO ship. Building on the visibility achieved through this stunt,
Defend Europe started a crowd funding campaign to conduct a more ambitious
mission. Upon requests of society groups, including activists from maritime rescue
NGOs, money transfer platforms like Paypal denied their services to Defend Europe.
Nevertheless, identitarians managed to collect sufficient donation to charter a ship
(Mulhall 2017).
At first, Defend Europe’s purported goal was to directly block all humanitarian ships,
but eventually settled for the more modest objective of monitoring NGOs’ activities to
document their alleged collusion with smugglers. Like the very NGOs it opposed,
Defend Europe purportedly endeavoured to combine advocacy and SAR, seeking to
both act as a watchdog for NGOs and “add a ship to the humanitarian rescuing fleet”.
Unlike all other civil society organisations, however, Defend Europe endeavoured to
bring migrants back to Libya rather than to a place of safety in Italy, thereby seeking to
combine rescuing lives with stopping the unregulated migratory flows deemed as a
threat to European identity. The impact of these actions was modest at best. Identitarians
failed to both provide evidence of NGOs’ collusion with smugglers and assist migrants in
distress. Defend Europe’s advocacy, however, helped funnel many of the unfounded accu-
sations used to criminalise NGOs by Italian authorities in mainstream public debates. In
their discourses and interviews with the author, Defend Europe used humanitarian dis-
courses as a legitimising tool, portraying themselves as the “real” humanitarians.3 As
noted by Schneiker (2018), however, far right organisations appropriating humanitarian
roles promote an exclusionary, particularistic understanding of human rights that sets
them drastically apart from both traditional and new humanitarians’ cosmopolitan
ethics. As such, the right-wing organisations that have recently ventured in the humani-
tarian arena like Defend Europe can be identified as having a distinct, communitarian role
conception (Table 2).
6. Discussion: cooperation and competition among maritime
humanitarians
As illustrated above, the maritime humanitarian space off the Libyan coast featured the
presence of NGOs featuring different goals and rescue models, which have engaged in
a complex web of relations at both the operational and the directive level. Leveraging
the typology outlined in section two, the subsection below examines each of these
forms of interaction.
6.1. Hostility and competition
Consistent with the argument that role conceptions are the best predictor of interactions
between NGOs, instances of open hostility and competition can primarily be found only
between organisations that played diametrically opposed roles.
As an actor with a communitarian role conception that held sea rescue NGOs guilty of
facilitating irregular migration to Europe, Defend Europe sought to both delegitimise and
directly disrupt and sabotage humanitarians’ work. In their demonstrative action in May
2017, Defend Europe tried to stop SOS-Méditerranée vessel from leaving an Italian port,
and later considered sabotaging NGO ships by borrowing from the repertoire of action
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of environmental NGOs like Greenpeace, such as the use of fishing net against whaling
ships’ propellers. The harsh legal consequences of such actions, which could even
amount to piracy and therefore to a crime against humanity, urged Defend Europe to
opt for more modest, symbolic stunts like attaching stickers on NGO ships, waving
banners, and voicing threatening messages through megaphones. Identitarian activists
also sought to disrupt rallies and fundraising events organised by NGOs in Germany,
and even allegedly tried to infiltrate NGO crews. Moreover, Defend Europe engaged in
a vehement delegitimation campaign against humanitarian actors. By stigmatising
NGOs as “useful idiots” or “accomplices of smuggler mafias”, or directly framing them
as “criminals” and “smugglers”, Defend Europe consistently sought to debunk NGOs’
altruistic motives. Identitarians claimed that by “luring Africans into the sea”, the “so
called humanitarian NGOs are responsible for the mass drowning of thousands in the
Mediterranean”, deliberately ignoring “the humanitarian collateral damage caused by
their own actions” in order to “play the role of saviours” and enrich themselves
through donations. In addition, Defend Europe pursued a strategy of frame-jacking
(Bob 2012), appropriating NGOs’ role and depicting itself as the only truly humanitarian
organisation. Accordingly, the Identitarians refused any form of cooperation with NGOs,
and even turned down NGOs’ offer of support when their ship was left adrift due to
engine malfunctioning.
For their part, other sea rescue NGOs refrained from answering Identitarians’ provoca-
tions but issued several vocal condemnations of Defend Europe, repeatedly criticising it
and denouncing it to Italian authorities as a fascist organisation. Even if they did not
deny assistance to Defend Europe, humanitarian NGOs used the fact that Identitarians
had to launch an SOS call to ridicule their seafaring credentials. Furthermore, activists
from NGOs sought to disrupt Defend Europe’s fundraising strategies by joining the
online mobilisation campaign aimed at banning them from crowd funding platforms
like PayPal and preventing the docking of the Identitarians’ ship in Italian, Maltese and
Tunisian ports.
Table 2. Sea rescue NGOs off the coast of Libya, 2014–2017.
NGO Vessels Starting date Operational model





MSF 50 m Dignity 1





Rescue, Disembarkation and Open Borders Advocacy






Patrol, Rescue, and Open Borders Advocacy





LifeBoat Project 23 m Minden June 2016 Patrol, Rescue, and Open Borders Advocacy
ProActiva 30 m Astral
37 m Golfo Azzurro





SOS-Méditerranée 77 m Aquarius February 2016 Rescue, Disembarkation, and Open Borders Advocacy
Jugend Rettet 37 m Iuventa July 2016 Patrol, Rescue and Open Borders Advocacy
Save the Children 57 m Vos Hestia September 2016 Rescue and Disembarkation
Mission Lifeline 33 mt Lifeline
20 mt Eleonore
June 2017 Patrol, Rescue and Open Borders Advocacy
Defend Europe 37 m C-Star August 2017 Patrol, Rescue, and Anti-immigration Advocacy
EUROPEAN SECURITY 13
6.2. Mistrust and coexistence
Outright hostility and glaring competition can only be found in the interactions between
sea rescue NGOs and not-for-profit organisations with different agendas and much
shakier humanitarian credentials like Defend Europe. All the charities deployed at sea
with the main goal of rescuing migrants, by contrast, generally displayed constructive
interactions. Some less pronounced but notable instance of mistrust between traditional
and new maritime humanitarians can nevertheless be found. When interviewed by the
author in 2016 and 2017, those working in new humanitarian NGOs consistently
expressed reservations at their traditional counterparts, and vice-versa.
MOAS in particular was looked at with suspicion by new humanitarian organisations.
The fact that the Maltese charity was the spin-off of a commercial risk management
company and their reliance on former Maltese military personnel and surveillance
drones led several activists to confidentially refer to MOAS as a “paramilitary organis-
ation”. MOAS’ decision to share drone footage with Italian authorities was also criticised
as incompatible with the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Some activists also
raised the concern (which later proved unfounded) that MOAS would do anything to pre-
serve a good working relationship with European authorities, including returning
migrants to Libya. The fear that MOAS would share information with Italian authorities
made Sea-Watch wary of including personnel from the Maltese charity in the WhatsApp
group used by activists to exchange information. Sea-Watch activists also expressed a pre-
ference for having the migrants temporarily rescued by their ship disembarked into SOS-
Mediterranee or MSF’s larger ships rather than MOAS’, because the former would purport-
edly provide a warmer treatment and better support services for asylum seekers.4 MOAS
was not the only target of off the record criticism. Save the Children’s use of private secur-
ity guards was flagged as inappropriate by several interviewees, who considered this
policy especially problematic in light of the role played by these guards in the investi-
gation against Jugend Rettet.5 An activist from Sea-Watch also expressed reservations
on the humanitarian credentials of Open Arms, seen as an easy way for a commercial
firm to obtain some good publicity.6 For their part, MOAS’ personnel took issues with
the “commendable, but amateurish” behaviour of small German NGOs’, seen as political
activists rather than trained rescuers and maritime safety professionals.7 Mistrust
increased after the issuing of 2017 code of conduct by the Italian government, signed
by some NGOs but not by others.
These elements of mistrust did not hinder NGOs’ smooth coexistence at sea. Although
they sometimes privately expressed doubts or concerns about other organisations, no
NGO called into question their counterpart’s right to provide SAR and their meaningful
contribution to the common cause of stopping deaths at sea. Even in private, off-the-
record conversations with the author, humanitarian crew members stressed that given
the magnitude of the area to be patrolled and the large number of casualties at sea,
“the small ships manned by German volunteers help too”, or recognised MOAS’ “impress-
ive” professionalism and technical know-how. Indeed, several interviewees stressed the
“healthy division of labour” in place between large and small rescue ships.8 Consequently,
it is safe to argue that all NGOs effectively coexisted in the maritime humanitarian space,
and humanitarian personnel recognised the positive role of other organisations notwith-
standing disagreements.
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However, mistrust inhibited close coordination at the directive level, preventing NGOs
from speaking with a single voice when negotiating access to the humanitarian space
with Italian authorities. When confronted with the dilemma of signing the code of
conduct, maritime rescue NGOs did not negotiate a common position beforehand. As a
result, MOAS, Save, Open Arms and Sea-Eye immediately signed the code, while MSF,
Sea-Watch and Jugend Rettet denounced it as a violation of humanitarian principles.
SOS-Meditérranée initially criticised the code, but eventually decided to sign after obtain-
ing some personal reassurance from Italian authorities. This inability to hold a common
position weakened the cohesion of the maritime humanitarian community.
Growing mistrust between organisations with different role conceptions weakened
mutual solidarity in the wake of the criminalisation process started in 2017, when
several NGOs were accused of serving as a pull factor of migration or even colluding
with human smugglers. This process culminated in August, when Jugend Rettet was
accused of aiding and abetting illegal immigration through evidence partly provided
by the security contractors working aboard Save the Children’s ship. Traditional humani-
tarian NGOs indirectly lent some credit to these accusations, distancing themselves from
the German youth organisation and likeminded charities. For instance, MOAS’ founder
pointed out that their “modus operandi” was very different from Jugend Rettet’s, noting
that the German NGO under investigation “will have to explain many things” to Italian
authorities (Ziniti 2017). Distrust towards Jugend Rettet was also voiced by other organis-
ations’ workers in chats and phone conversations acquired by investigators as court evi-
dence and supported Italian media portrayal of German rescuers as “Berliner squat camp”
(Viviano and Ziniti 2017). Besides harming Jugend Rettet and other small charities, these
discourses damaged the maritime humanitarian community at large by triggering a guilt
by association mechanism.
6.3. Coordination, cooperation, and integration
Regardless of their different positions, all sea rescue charities coordinated effectively
when conducting SAR. This coordination was facilitated by different factors. First, NGOs
are all subjected to the compliance pull of the maritime rescue norm, and thus operate
within an overarching normative framework. Second, all NGOs have operated under
the guidance of the Italian MRCC, which has served as an overarching authority facilitating
their mutual coordination. Third, when still supportive of the role of NGOs at sea Italian
authorities provided several opportunities for NGO personnel to meet, such as the
Shade Med and Una Vis meetings organised in Rome by the Italian Navy and Coast
Guard. These meetings provided avenues for information exchange and trust-building
at the directive level. Several instances of operational coordination can also be found.
To ensure an effective patrolling of the areas where shipwrecks were most likely to
occur, NGOs regularly shared their ships’ positions and routes via radio.
Although some coordination between rescue ships was ensured by international mar-
itime regulations and Italian authorities, only organisations with similar role conceptions
turned coordination at sea into a regular and systematic form of cooperation. Most
notably, NGOs with matching role conceptions engaged in regular exchanges of infor-
mation through private WhatsApp groups, a shared database, and meetings at the direc-
tive level. Far from raising entry barriers into the provision of rescue services, already-
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established NGOs provided active guidance to like-minded organisations, encouraging
them to follow their example. Most notably, Sea-Watch explicitly sought to find imitators
in civil society, offering advice to NGOs wishing to follow their example. Evidence of
cooperation between organisations with similar role conceptions is not solely limited
to exchanges of information. Likeminded organisations frequently exchanged personnel
too. For instance, activists from Jugend Rettet, Lifeboat, and Mission Lifeline frequently
joined Sea-Watch crews to gain experience. Personnel from Sea-Watch also came from
or transitioned to MSF. In addition, likeminded NGOs regularly exchanged equipment,
ranging from life vests to ships. For instance, Sea-Watch handed over speedboat
engines to Jugend Rettet, and gave its older ship to Mission Lifeline after acquiring a
larger boat at a discounted price by MSF Barcelona. Cooperation is also epitomised by
mutual solidarity between likeminded organisations. When the Italian government
delayed the disembarkation of Sea-Eye’s ship, which was forced to station offshore for
several days in April 2019, MOAS organised a shipment of food and medical supplies.
NGOs with similar role conceptions also vocally condemned the criminalisation of
fellow organisations. When Jugend Rettet’s ship was impounded, for instance, Sea-
Watch responded by campaigning in their favour, stressing that “sea rescue is not a
crime” and their organisation is “solidary to all rescuers and all those rescued”. On the
other hand, as mentioned above, organisations upholding different roles like MOAS
and Save distanced themselves from Jugend Rettet. In several cases, role conceptions
affected organisations’ varying propensity to unite forces and develop structured partner-
ships. Owing to their different roles, MSF and MOAS decided to reconsider their attempt
to launch a joint mission and seek more likeminded operational partners. Accordingly,
MOAS started collaborating with a traditional humanitarian actor like the Italian Red
Cross, while MSF Amsterdam found in SOS-Meditérranée a partner that shared their com-
mitment to open borders advocacy. While this paper focuses on the 2014–2017 time-
frame, it is worth mentioning that Sea-Watch’s close relationship with MSF also
resulted into the launching of a joint mission in 2020. Together, the two organisations
purchased an oceanographic research vessel, manned by Sea-Watch seafarers and res-
cuers, and MSF medical personnel. MOAS, on the other hand, announced the launching
of a joint mission with Sea-Eye.
7. Role conceptions and NGO–NGO relations at sea
As anticipated in section two, matching role conceptions are conducive to mutual trust
and therefore tighter forms of cooperation. By contrast, diverging or incompatible roles
should trigger distrust, competition, or even open hostility.
The evidence presented above provides strong support for this claim. Although they
described themselves as humanitarian actors, organisations that embraced an identitarian
role conception implicitly denying the universality of basic human rights, such as Defend
Europe, developed an adversarial relationship with maritime rescue charities, directly
attempting to disrupt, confront, and delegitimise their activities. The smaller gap in the
role conceptions of traditional and new humanitarian NGOs did not inhibit smooth coex-
istence and a meaningful degree of coordination in the field, but caused diffuse distrust
and hindered tighter forms of collaboration at the policy level. Only fully matching role
conceptions enabled systematic, fully fledged cooperation at both the operational and
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the directive level by fostering trust among maritime activists and mutual solidarity in the
wake of the criminalisation process started in 2017 (Figure 1).
7.1. Competing explanations
The diverse patchwork of NGO–NGO interactions described above cannot be accounted
for by competing explanations based on the political economy of the non-governmental
sector, sociological institutionalism and organisations’ nationality.
A political economy approach suggests that as a humanitarian “market” characterised
by low entry barriers and growing organisational density like non-governmental sea
rescue should be fraught with competition (Bush and Hadden 2019, Mitchell 2014,
Cooley and Ron 2002). SAR NGOs, mostly consisting of small, newly established charities
providing the same services and lacking a large financial base should inevitably engage in
competitive relations. Most notably, the small, German NGOs operating off the coast of
Libya primarily conducted fundraising campaigns in German, drew on the same pool of
German donors, and even developed similar media campaigns based on similar pictures
and slogans, including “don’t forget them at sea” (Sea-Watch), “Everyone in maritime
emergencies deserves rescue” (Jugend Rettet), and “saving lives at sea is our duty”
(Mission Lifeline). Moreover, such NGOs developed the same rescue models, using
small vessels to patrol the Southern Mediterranean and assist migrants until the arrival
of a larger ship. In fact, similarities between these charities were such that even intervie-
wees from the Italian Coast Guard and Navy admitted having trouble distinguishing “the
small German NGOs” from one another.9 Contrary to what a political economy approach
to sea rescue NGOs would suggest, however, most small sea rescue NGOs developed tight
forms of cooperation. Far from establishing entry barriers into the maritime humanitarian
space, NGOs like Sea-Watch willingly shared their expertise with newer organisations.
Instead of faltering, this cooperation grew even stronger as donations shrunk: to cope
with increasingly scarce resources, these NGOs stepped up their cooperation by continu-
ing to exchange personnel and equipment.
Figure 1. Maritime non-governmental actors’ role conceptions.
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The analogy between NGOs and firms underlying political economy approaches also
suggests that NGOs developing somewhat complementary types of missions and
relying on different donors should be more likely to cooperate. Accordingly, small
NGOs conducting maritime patrol missions could fruitfully collaborate with organisations
with larger boats transporting migrants to Europe: while the former could save fuel by
relying on their larger counterparts’ bigger ships, the latter could capitalise on the visi-
bility and media engagement that bringing migrants to safety in an Italian port could
provide. However, NGOs’ propensity to collaborate seems dictated primarily by matching
role conceptions rather than logistical complementarity. Accordingly, smaller German
NGOs like Sea-Watch and Jugend Rettet collaborated tightly with one another and with
likeminded charities with larger boats likes MSF and SOS-Mèditerranée. By contrast,
their relationship with other NGOs with large ships but different role conceptions like
MOAS and Save remained less developed despite logistical incentives and different
funding sources. MOAS’ cooperation was smoother with those smaller NGOs with a
more neutral and less advocacy-oriented role conception like Sea-Eye and Open Arms.
Hence, a political economy approach ultimately proves ill-suited to explain NGO–NGO
interactions at sea.
An institutionalist framework, on the other hand, provides more valuable insights into
NGOs’ overall ability to coordinate and collaborate in the field. The fact that all NGOs had
to adhere to the same maritime safety standards, operated under the coordination of the
Italian MRCC, and were subjected to the same compliance pull of the maritime rescue
norm mitigated potential competition and mistrust, enabling collaborative interactions
at the operational level. This institutional framework eased problems of collective
action and reduced miscommunication and confusion at the operational level, enabled
smooth coordination across the humanitarian fleet by, for instance, preventing
different NGOs to simultaneously rush to the same migrant boat in distress. Outright hos-
tility only occurred in interactions with Defend Europe, an outlier that denounced the
duty to rescue as a catalyst of illegal immigration and appropriated humanitarian dis-
courses for instrumental, exclusionary goals. By threatening harsh legal consequences
for extreme actions like sabotaging NGO ships and establishing a general duty of
cooperation to ensure the safety of life at sea, however, the formal rules enshrined in
the international law of the sea prevented this hostility from escalating. While it effectively
captures the general tendency for humanitarian seafarers to cooperate under existing
regulations and norms, this institutional regime alone cannot account for the tighter or
looser degrees of mistrust or cooperation across different organisations. As noted by
Stroup (2012, p. 7) NGOs are not “passive carriers of transnational norms”, but purposive
actors with their own identities and interests. Consequently, a fine-grained understanding
of why some organisations decided to go beyond their statutory obligations to coordi-
nate and engage in tighter interactions requires looking into the different identities of
each of these NGOs.
Stroup’s argument that NGOs’ identity mainly derives from their national origins would
suggest that being headquartered in and mainly recruiting personnel from the same
country should act as a key catalyst of cooperation between sea rescue NGOs. Indeed,
the tight interactions between the five different German NGOs that were deployed at
sea indicate that national cultural affinities do ease trust and facilitate cooperation.
However, nationality alone does not explain why some NGOs sharing the same
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nationality, like Sea-Watch andMission Lifeline, collaborated more closely than others, nor
does it account for the close cooperation between organisations headquartered in
different countries like MOAS and Sea-Eye, or MSF and Sea-Watch. Ultimately, the
match in organisations’ role explains NGO–NGO interactions in a more accurate fashion
than all the competing explanations identified above.
8. Conclusions
In this article, I have sought to provide a threefold contribution to the study of maritime
security, border control, and humanitarianism. First, I have added to our empirical knowl-
edge of European maritime migration governance and the role of NGOs therein by
mapping the interactions between maritime humanitarian actors. Second, I have sought
to advance the study of cooperation and competition in the humanitarian sector by devel-
oping a more comprehensive typology that identifies seven distinct levels of interactions
and may be fruitfully applied to humanitarian spaces on land as well. Third, I have intro-
duced a novel explanation of NGO–NGO cooperation, showing that humanitarian role con-
ceptions provide a more accurate and fine-grained account of interactions between NGOs
than competing explanations based on the political economy of the non-governmental
sector, sociological institutionalism, and organisations’ nationality.
The finding that matching or diverging role conceptions are the key factor informing
NGOs’ tendency to engage in hostile or cooperative relations has significant theoretical
and policy implications. From a theoretical standpoint, my findings concur with previous
constructivist research in stressing the importance of identities and cultures in shaping
the behaviour of NGOs and the cohesion of the humanitarian community, whose
members often uphold competing understandings of humanitarianism. Due to the very
nature of maritime rescue operations, where effective coordination is crucial to save
lives, these findings have important policy implications as well. The disengagement of
Italian and European military assets from the Southern Mediterranean magnified the
importance of sea rescue NGOs, which became the largest provider of SAR off the
Libyan coast in both 2016 and 2017. Even if they did not prevent coordination on the
field, the different roles upheld by sea rescue NGOs inhibited more effective cooperation
at the directive level. Different role conceptions andmutual distrust prevented NGOs from
reaching a common position and speaking with a single voice when the Italian govern-
ment started to restrain non-governmental sea rescue through the 2017 code of
conduct. The fact that some NGOs signed the code while some others did not further
strain the cohesion of the humanitarian fleet, weakening mutual solidarity when some
organisations were accused of abetting illegal immigration and preventing NGOs from
forming a united front vis-à-vis delegitimation campaigns. This lack of cohesion severely
weakened the maritime humanitarian cause, facilitating the criminalisation strategies
carried out by hostile government agencies and civil society organisations like Defend
Europe.
Notes
1. Interview with MSF worker, June 2016; Interview with MOAS worker, August 2016.
2. Interview with Open Arms worker, June 2016.
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3. Interview with Defend Europe activist, July 2017.
4. Interview with Sea-Watch worker, August 2017.
5. Interview with MSF worker, September 2017; interview with Sea-Watch worker, September
2017.
6. Interview with Sea-Watch worker, August 2016.
7. Interview with MOAS worker, August 2016.
8. Interview with MSF worker, June 2016; Interview with Sea-Eye worker, June 2016; interview
with Open Arms worker, June 2016; interview with MOAS worker, August 2016.
9. Interview with Italian Coast Guard Officer, June 2016; Interview with Italian Navy Officer, June
2016.
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